(Appeared in Japan
International Journal, Tokyo Japan, 1993.)
keith harmon snow
ÒThey say members of
government and trading companies from Japan bribe the officialsÉÓ
ÒCorruption?Ó he asked me.
ÒThey say it still
happens a lot in Malaysia and IndonesiaÉÓ
ÒYes. Malaysia,
Indonesia,Ó he laughed. ÒKorea, the Philippines,
these are very popular.Ó
Fumio
Fukasawa,
(Forest
Products) Mitsubishi Corporation
Interviewed
in Tokyo, Japan, 1993.
This time itÕs War.
As this issue goes to press, freighters
"Dooyang Coral" and "Shiney River" sit in Japanese harbors
loaded with logs illegally exported from Cambodia by Mitsui & Company in
direct violation of the November 1992 ban on timber exports imposed by the U.N.
Transitional Authority in Cambodia.
Japan Inc. -- much to the embarrassment of Japan
Inc. -- has been caught once again. Furthering the 'shame' while these
violations were occurring, Japan held the post of Chairman of the U.N. Security
Council. While diplomats and officials in Phnom Pehn have said that
"Japanese companies should take moral responsibility for these
violations," when viewed alongside other recent and historical Japanese
government and zaibatsu activities (see Cambodia
pesticides sidebar) it is clear that 'morality', 'responsibility' and 'ethics'
are as foreign as concepts of 'sustainability' and 'environmental impact'. So
much for the infamous Japanese creed of the respectful and honorable samurai.
With Cambodia,
peace is not coming easy. While the uncooperative Khmer Rouge was the first to
flag-red as an environmental greenie-meany,
all four warring factions have
taken advantage of the insatiable foreign hunger for natural resources, even cooperating at times, to sell at any cost under the white flag
of truce. Blowing holes in the environmental cease-fire declared by the UN, in
the face of timber exports five
times higher than sustainable
levels, Japanese companies have been 'buying back' the Cambodian war.
THE
INTERNATIONAL TROPICAL TIMBER ORGANIZATION (ITTO) sponsored by Japan consists of 43 member countries
designated with international trade monitoring and controls responsibilities.
The ITTO has been widely criticized as a puppet tool for the logging industry
where member delegates convene and no consensus in policy can be reached.
According to "Incentives and Sustainability - Where is the ITTO
Going?" a WWF (World Wildlife Fund) publication, historically, member
delegates have lost their way in a forest of issues, effectively wielding the
saw rather than shielding it.
Although it was a
surprise to most -- and a shock to Japan -- that the ITTO Mission to Sarawak
(1990) recommended an immediate reduction in logging rates, a moratorium in
areas where land disputes with indigenous people exist, and forestry management
practices be subject to complete review, logging rates actually increased,
reaching unprecedented levels in 1992. The ITTO recommendations were blatantly
ignored. The logging has continued (See: keith harmon snow: The
Disappearance of Bruno Manser.)
JAPAN IS CERTAINLY NOT ALONE.
It takes two to trade in a tropical
tree tango.
One of the most
powerful and destructive factors is the over-issuing of timber licenses in
producer countries. Corruption in business and politics is harvesting fortunes
in short-term profits, liquidating forests today, leaving logged-out
liabilities for tomorrow.
In the Indonesian
forestry sector, for example, some 3,840,700 hectares (ha) of timber
concessions are reported to be in ÔprotectionÕ forests and 710,000 ha in
ÔconservationÕ forests. One man alone -- timber tycoon Bob Hasan -- privately
controls more than 2 million ha of Indonesian forest concessions.
In the 1987
elections in Sarawak the rival political parties each 'leaked' their opponents'
huge concession holdings to the press. The Chief Minister froze the holdings of
the opposition, which were valued (1990) at around US$1-2 billion. Political
largess has left over 60% of the remaining forests designated as private
concessions, ignoring traditional rights of the indigenous people.
When the Aquino
Government took power in 1986 after the corrupt Marcos regime, the Philippine
Forestry Agency instituted a moratorium on log exports. Although the moratorium
continues, so do illegal logging and export.
In 1991, a
Philippine priest was murdered for his crusade against corruption in Palawan (a
measure of the sanctity of sawdust) and even today soldiers reportedly ride
shotgun on logging trucks. That shipments go to Japan, directly, or via
Malaysia, is no longer up for debate: it is the law of the jungle.
TIMBERFROMTHESOUTH
SEAS: An analysis of
Japan's Tropical Timber Trade and its Environmental Impact is a
comprehensive study of Japanese involvement in the tropical timber trade. This
WWF report (1989) 'outlines the history of trade, exposes the effects of
logging activities on tropical forest environments, details the Japanese
companies involved and examines the uses of timber in Japan itself.'
For about 20 years
Japan has been the world's major tropical timber importer, importing 15.7
million cubic meters (m3) of tropical hardwood products in 1986, 20.6 million
cubic meters in 1987, worth about US$2 billion, representing 29% of the world
trade, equal to the amount imported by the EEC as a whole and exceeding that
imported by the USA. In 1987, 96% of imports came only from Sarawak and Sabah
(Malaysia) and Papua New Guinea. The Philippines and Indonesia were Japan's
major suppliers in the 1960s and 1970s.
There are four key
reasons why Japan has been the world's major importer for so long: (1) the
excessive timber and paper requirements of the booming Japanese economy; (2)
the high cost of domestically grown timber; (3) the availability of cheap, high
quality timber from Southeast Asia; (4) imports are organized by the principal
general trading houses, or sogo shosha (zaibatsu).
"JAPANESE
BIG BUSINESS AND TRADING COMPANIES are
part of the complete cycle of tropical timber trade and exploitation.' says
Yoichi Kuroda, driving force behind the Japan Tropical Forest Action Network
(JATAN) and co-author of 'Timber From The South Seas'. "They have long
time relations: personally, financially, technically. They provide market
access, and financial and technical support, including instruction on such
things as logging extremely hilly terrain."
"Do they avoid
critically sensitive watershed areas? Or the habitat of endangered species like
the orangutan?" I asked him.
'No. They never
have such sensitivity. They log only for efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
There are Japanese camp managers, timber graders and measurers in Sarawak, even
though the logging company may be owned by Sarawakian businessmen
themselves," says Kuroda. "Many technical specialists are imported
from the Philippines, where the forest is already gone: engineers for road
construction, camp managers who know the Japanese market very well and can
guarantee the quality of timber. Japan demand is very special. They need
detailed information on resources in every particular forest."
"You mean what
is coming next or what still exists, or both?"
"Both.
Everything."
BILLIONS OF DOLLARSÉ
Éin foreign exchange monies, uncollected
forestry-related charges and resource exploitation over the last decade,
according to a report by the TRAFFIC Network of WWF and the International Union
for the Conservation of Nature. ÒHundreds of thousands of hectares of forest,
containing millions of cubic meters of timber, have been logged each year
either illegally or to supply the illegal trade ... activities are often
interactive and often facilitated by fraudulent practices in documentation and
the collusion of corrupt officials and powerful politicians."
Illegal logging
activities include logging of endangered or protected species; logging outside
concession area boundaries and in protected areas; the removal of under-sized
trees; or extraction volumes or rates exceeding allowable harvests.
One of the most
blatant cases of abuse involved Bintuni Utama Murni Wood Industries,
principally owned by Marubeni (see Bruno Manser), where endangered
mangroves were illegally logged in Bintuni Bay, Irian Jaya (Indonesia).
Bintuni's logging license was suspended (1990) and they were fined US$631,246
for neglecting the mandatory environmental impact assessment. Such fees are
miniscule in comparison to profits however, and, more generally, companies are
not caught, never fined.
Timber smuggling is
best exemplified by the Philippines, where the Aquino government in 1987
formally requested Japan's assistance in curbing 'illegal trade' between the
two nations. Japan indicated that the problem was purely an internal matter of
the Philippines: request denied.
Japan's complicity
becomes obvious however, upon examination of trade statistics. In 1986 alone,
199,600 m3 of logs were exported from the Philippines, while Japanese import
statistics show 284,400 cubic meters: a discrepancy of 84,800 cubic meters. In
1987, the discrepancy -- timber showing up in Japan -- was 35,100 cubic meters.
Some estimates of
losses in Philippine forestry related incomes are as high as US $l billion annually
(1991); others are higher. With no reciprocal trade restrictions on imports of
Philippine timber to Japan, Philippine forests continue to fall, economic
losses continue to rise, and the Philippine people (domestic corruption
notwithstanding) suffer rapacious plunder primarily facilitated by Taiwan,
Korea and Japan.
On 26 November
1991, then Senator Al Gore introduced a resolution into the US Senate on a
range of issues regarding deforestation in the Philippines, including the
recommendation that "the US Senate encourage the Japanese government to
look at its role importing illegally traded timber." (Of course, GoreÕs
actions are driven by financial interests, not environmental ethics.)
According to a
Kyodo New Service report (November 1992), the Philippine Government has
unofficially indicated that Japan's help in curbing timber smuggling will again
be sought in 1993.
Transfer pricing is
one of the most widely practiced, invisible forms of corruption in Southeast
Asia (evidently wide-spread in many industries). This is simple cheating on
taxes, intentionally avoiding import/export duties, or substantially modifying,
altering, or misrepresenting actual trade circumstances to maximize profits.
The ITTO Mission to
Sarawak (1990) determined that "the system cannot control transfer
pricing... in both Sarawak and Sabah, with transfer of funds to Hong Kong
banks." Profits, or 'economic rents' which might otherwise be staving off
the destruction of indigenous people's lands, are primarily ending up in Japan.
Transfer pricing
was widely documented in Papua New Guinea, where, according to TRAFFIC,
"more detailed estimates are available for losses incurred through
malpractice... than for any other tropical timber producing country."
Estimated losses from 1982 to 1987, from transfer pricing alone, range from
US$100 to $270 million.
In 1987, Paias
Wingti, then Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, initiated the Commission of
Inquiry into Aspects of the Timber Industry in Papua New Guinea, chaired by
Supreme Court justice Thomas Barnett. The inquiry's report was written from a
legislative (rather than environmental) point of view, mainly to investigate
property rights, tax law, responsibility in public office, and administrative
structures.
The Barnett
Report (1990) – as it came to be known -- is a highly regarded and
remarkable piece of research into actual operations in Papua New Guinea. The
findings of the report fit very closely with what is known of the timber
industry in Malaysia and Indonesia, applicable to these and other countries in
the Asia-Pacific region.
"It would be
fair to say of some of the companies, reads an interim report, 'that they are
now roaming the countryside with the self-assurance of robber barons; bribing
politicians and leaders, creating social disharmony and ignoring laws in order
to gain access to, rip out and export the last remnants of the province's
valuable timber."
The inquiry found
transfer pricing by the following Japanese companies at the scales given:
GAISHO -- greater than US$6,976,744; Santa Investments -- around .US$1,285,120
in 1986 through HUNDAI TIMBERS;
SHIN ASAHIGAWA -- US$6,833,713 from 1981-1987; Stettin Bay Lumber -- more than
US$3,000,000 from 1985 -1987 to NISSHO IWAI; UNITED TIMBERS -- US$1,500,000 in
less than two years to MITSUBISHI.
Besides transfer
pricing, GAISHO ignored environmental clauses in their permit and were
eventually asked to leave Papua New Guinea. JANT CO. operated for many years
without showing a profit under an exclusive sales arrangement with parent
company HONSI PAPER (affiliated with Mitsui). JANT also continued to cut after
their contract expired (I991), clearly violating environmental restrictions.
Open Bay Timbers (Sohbu Co.) breached
the terms and conditions of the Project Agreement resulting in a recommendation
for termination. Under significant diplomatic pressure from Japan however,
Papua New Guinea authorities suggested that a new agreement be negotiated.
Sumitomo, on a
regular basis, deliberately and systematically falsified shipment
documentation. United Timbers and Mitsubishi, involved in under-measuring and
false declaration of species -- other profit based fraudulent practices -- were
also involved in systematic transfer pricing in Indonesia.
The report had
little positive impact. Barnett comments (1990): ÒEven after the publicity
given to forestry malpractice É
the same practices are occurring, and often the same companies and
individuals are involved ..."
Thomas Barnett was stabbed
outside his
Port Moresby home after
publication of the report.
Complete
suppression has left no part of the report accessible to the people in Papua
New Guinea. "Of course Barnett almost died but finally survived after a
long period of hospitalization," says Yoichi Kuroda. "It is widely
believed that the powerful timber industry or ministries sent someone to kill
him."
CENSORSHIP
AND MANIPULATION of the media in
Japan have furthered the injustices done to the developing countries of
Southeast Asia by withholding the truth from the Japanese people. Huge PR
campaigns by industry concerns and government bodies have successfully
misinformed the public. As human rights activist Bruno Manser points out,
"I believe most of the Japanese people do not know the truth."
In 1990, the
Ministry of Education distributed a Mitsubishi funded comic book to high school
students at about 5,000 Japanese schools, where information was selectively
misconstrued to portray Mitsubishi as a sort of southeast Asian tropical
forestry hero. According to the Sarawak Campaign Committee, "We don't know
if these have been completely recalled. A poll of teachers in November (1992)
suggested that they had not, even though the Ministry of education agreed to do
so.Ó
Public relations
ploys and Earth Summit speeches indicate that words and the empty promises are
the only 'sustainable' elements in the issue. Corporate Environment &
Ethics Departments have blossomed overnight, stealing the light from the forest
and shining it brightly on PR campaigns, to shadow the destructive activities
of corporate diversity.
Misinformation
within the corporate ecosystems penetrates far deeper than the roots of the
tropical trees that are so casually felled. Employees are showered with
rainforest related literature attesting to 'corporate environmental concern'
and 'conscientious forestry'; most have erroneously been led to believe that,
as a bare minimum, huge replanting and regeneration schemes are undertaken.
Meanwhile, as Marubeni's Environmental Affairs Department readily admits:
"Environmental impact assessment is not our business." (keith harmon
snow: personal interview, December 1992).
Stacks of glossy
brochures, pamphlets and carefully designed 'position' papers, like
Mitsubishi's "The Facts about the Tropical Rainforest Issue" or
"Forever Green: Malaysia and Sustainable Forest Management", all
mislead and misconstrue very precisely and successfully. In these, greater
efficiency of operations and further utilization of wastes and residuals are
pointed to as panaceas, seen as justification for self-promotion of 'Good
Corporate Citizenry' and 'Environmental Friendliness'. While not to be derided
-- on the contrary, greater efficiency is critical -- these modifications in
business often simply enhance market access and control, further maximizing profits.
It has nothing to do with environmental stewardship.
Marubeni, for
example, "has begun producing Medium-Density fiberboard (MDF) from old
rubber tree stock which was previously destroyed, producing great wastage. Our
pace-setting experiment in recycling waste timber into high-quality MDF is
attracting much favorable attention." Marubeni forgets its unspoken
mandate of monoculturalization -- selective single species plantations for
paper, rubber, pineapple, cinnamon, or palm oil -- and golf courses, shrimp
farms, and huge irrigation projects intended to compensate for radical
ecological change due to denudification and erosion. These have blossomed all
over Southeast Asia, destroying aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems overnight.
'SUSTAINABILITY'
is the key to securing the
planet's future. If something is 'sustainable', for all practical purposes it
can continue forever. 'Sustainable development' has been defined as
'development that meets the needs of the present with out compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs'. Currently, however,
less than one-tenth of I% of total production of tropical timber can be
confidently assessed as sustainable. It is all disappearing very quickly.
With the cry for
cash from developing nations and demands for equality -- in standards of living
and prosperity already achieved by industrialized nations -- it is difficult --
impossible -- to expect conservation of natural resources. But the rapacious
and destructive timber industry -- at this moment – continues to rob
producer countries of considerable incomes in a vicious cycle of want, power
and greed. If the destruction meant food for impoverished children, at least,
that would be OK -- call it 'forests for food'.
In reality, it's
forests for famine. Add another to the list of issues with Ôtrees' and 'the
environment' and Ôhuman rights.Õ It is now an issue of WAR. That, is the
ultimate end.
End.
SIDEBAR: JAPANÕS
FATAL CONTRIBUTION TO CAMBODIA
DIAZANON AND
SUMICIDIN are two pest control substances with acute levels of carcinogens that
were recently (1992) donated to Cambodia with a 500 million yen agricultural
aid package orchestrated by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency
(JICA), benefiting Mitsui, Sumitomo and others. There was no environmental
impact assessment and no human health impact assessment.
This aid directly
conflicts with the recent UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)
and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) policies. Japan sponsored the
"Ministerial Conference on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of
Cambodia" in Tokyo (June). The FAO recommended cancellation of the project
because evidence indicates that at present balance exists between pests and
their natural enemies in Cambodia.
This is what the
'Handbook of Pesticides Regulated in the United States' says about one of these
pesticides:
"Do not
breathe spray, mist or dust. Do not get in eyes, on skin or on clothing. May be
fatal if swallowed and is readily absorbed through the skin. Do not use on
humans or allow people to enter the treated area until the spray has completely
dried. Has resulted in the death of 23 species of birds. Keep out of streams,
lakes, ponds, tidal marshes and estuaries. Do not use near or in water that
will be used for any purposes by humans or livestock."
According to the
over 10,000 member Japan Consumer's Union: "As in most overseas
development assistance (ODA) projects, information has been withheld,
feasibility studies inadequate ... this project ignores the realities in
Cambodia and only exists to secure overseas markets for Japanese
enterprises."